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Abstract
This paper critically analyses the strongly subjectivist approach to
exploitation theory recently proposed by Matsuo ([7]), in the context
of general convex economies with heterogeneous agents. It is proved
that the Fundamental Marxian Theorem is not preserved in his subjec-
tivist approach, contrary to Matsuo’s claims, and that no meaningful
subjectivist exploitation index can be constructed. It is argued that
a minimal objectivism is necessary in exploitation theory, whereby
subjective preferences do not play a direct, deﬁnitional role. An alter-
native objectivist approach is brieﬂy analysed, which is related to the
‘New Interpretation’ ([1]; [3]). It is argued that it captures the core
intuitions of exploitation theory and it provides appropriate indices
of individual and aggregate exploitation. Further, it is shown that it
preserves the FMT in general economies.
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11 Introduction
In the Marxian theory of exploitation, workers are said to be exploited if
the labour they expend is higher than the amount of labour contained in
some relevant bundle of wage goods, which measures the value of labour
power. This deﬁnition is seemingly intuitive, but even in stylised two-class
societies, it has proved surprisingly diﬃcult to provide a fully satisfactory
general theory of exploitation. First, outside the standard Leontief economy,
the deﬁnition of exploitation is ambiguous, for the appropriate deﬁnition of
the value of labour power is not obvious, and indeed a number of approaches
have been proposed (see [19]; [21]). In turn, this implies that the deﬁnition of
the exploitation index, measuring the amount of exploitation in the economy,
is controversial. This is a central issue because a theory of exploitation should
be able to compare diﬀerent societies in terms of their exploitation levels, and
to analyse the evolution of an economy, and its exploitation structure, over
time. Second, outside the Leontief setting, the core insights of exploitation
theory do not necessarily hold. For example, in more general economies, a
number of counterexamples to the so-called Fundamental Marxian Theorem
(FMT) have been produced. In standard approaches, this is also an impor-
tant issue because the FMT proves that exploitation is synonymous with
positive proﬁts. The relevance of the FMT is such that although it is proved
as a result, its epistemological status is that of a postulate: the appropriate
deﬁnition of exploitation, and of an exploitation index, is considered to be
one which preserves the FMT. A number of deﬁnitions of exploitation, and
exploitation indices, have been proposed precisely in an attempt to generalise
the FMT to economies with joint production, heterogenous labour, and so
on. (see, e.g., [10]; [6]; [12]. For recent debates, see [14]; [19].)
The main approaches in the literature deﬁne exploitation in relation to
the objective features of an economy (including data on production, con-
sumption, labour supply, etc.), with no direct reference to individual atti-
tudes, beliefs, and preferences. In a recent article, Matsuo [7] has proposed
an original theory of exploitation, in which agents’ preferences play a direct,
deﬁnitional role: workers are exploited if and only if there is a bundle of
g o o d st h a tt h e yw e a k l yp r e f e rt ot h ewage goods they receive and that can
be produced with less labour than they have expended. This approach can
be deﬁned as strongly subjectivist in order to distinguish it from other ap-
proaches in which preferences play an indirect role, e.g. via their inﬂuence
on individual consumption and labour decisions. According to Matsuo, his
2deﬁnition of exploitation is superior to the alternatives because it avoids the
standard counterexamples to the FMT (e.g. [12]; [13]).
This paper critically analyses Matsuo’s subjectivist approach, focusing
on the appropriate deﬁnition of an exploitation index and on the FMT, in
general convex economies with heterogeneous agents. Although some key
results of the subjectivist approach can be generalised, it is shown that, un-
der diﬀerent concepts of equilibrium, the FMT does not hold: contrary to
Matsuo’s claims, his subjectivist approach does not solve the problems of
traditional theories of exploitation. Further, due to the deﬁnitional role of
preferences, there is an inherent deep indeterminacy in his subjectivist mea-
sure of exploitation, such that no theoretically robust and empirically mean-
ingful index can be constructed. It is argued that a minimal objectivism is
necessary in exploitation theory and Matsuo’s approach is contrasted with
an objectivist deﬁnition of exploitation, which is conceptually related to the
so-called ‘New Interpretation’ ([1]; [2]; [3]). It is shown that the latter ap-
proach is preferable according to both criteria considered in this paper: it
provides a well-deﬁned individual and aggregate exploitation index and it
preserves the FMT in general convex economies with heterogeneous agents.
I ti si m p o r t a n tt on o t ea tt h eo u t s e tt h at exploitation theory is not just
about constructing an index of exploitation and proving the FMT, and an
exhaustive analysis of exploitation in advanced capitalist economies cannot
be limited to simple two-class models. Two points should be made here to
motivate the focus of this paper, and the models analysed. First, the theo-
retical starting point - and the main object of critical analysis - is Matsuo’s
[7] innovative contribution, which raises the interesting issue of whether, and
how, subjective preferences should count in the deﬁnition of exploitation.
Therefore, his model is signiﬁcantly generalised by allowing for heterogeneous
preferences and consumption bundles, and for a convex cone technology, but
some of the simplifying assumptions - such as the stark two-class structure -
are retained, for analytical and expositional purposes. Second, the construc-
tion of the aggregate exploitation index and the relation between proﬁts and
exploitation do not exhaust the discussion of the normative and positive rele-
vance of exploitation, but they are arguably crucial and do play a prominent
role in the literature, including in a number of recent articles appeared on
this journal (e.g., [15]; [4]; [5]; [9]). The general convex economies considered
in this paper are appropriate to analyse both issues and the simplifying as-
sumptions made are standard in the literature. It is worth noting, though,
that the ‘New Interpretation’ provides a general theoretical framework, which
3can deal with many unresolved issues in exploitation theory, in rather general
economies. Several extensions of our analysis are brieﬂy discussed in Section
6b e l o w .
2 The General Model
In this section, a general model for the analysis of exploitation is provided
along the lines of Roemer ([13], [14]), which allows for a general convex
cone technology, rather than the standard von Neumann framework often
used in exploitation theory. This is not just for the sake of formalism: the
diﬀerences between alternative approaches to exploitation and the anomalies
in the relation between proﬁts and exploitation become relevant when the
linear production model is abandoned.
2.1 Production
In the economy there are n produced commodities and one non-produced
good, namely labour. Let 0 ∈ Rn be such that 0 =( 0 ,...,0). Let P be
the production set: P h a se l e m e n t so ft h ef o r mα =( −α0,−α,α) where
α0 ∈ R+ , α ∈ Rn
+ ,a n dα ∈ Rn
+ . Thus, elements of P are vectors in R2n+1.
The ﬁrst component, −α0, is the direct labour input of the process α;t h e
next n components, −α, are the inputs of goods used in the process; and
the last n components, α, are the outputs of the n goods from the process.
The net output vector arising from α is denoted as b α ≡ α − α. The set P is
assumed to be a closed convex cone containing the origin in R2n+1.M o r e o v e r ,
it is assumed that:1
Assumption (A1). ∀α ∈ P s.t. α0 ≥ 0 and α = 0, [α ≥ 0 ⇒ α0 > 0];
Assumption (A2). ∀ c ∈ Rn
+ , ∃α ∈ P s.t. b α = c;
Assumption (A3). ∀α ∈ P, ∀(α0,α0) ∈ Rn
+ × Rn
+ ,
[(−α0,α0) 5 (−α,α) ⇒ (−α0,−α0,α0) ∈ P].
1For all vectors x =( x1,...,x n) and y =( y1,...,y n) ∈ Rn, x = y if and only if xi = yi
(i =1 ,...,n); x ≥ y if and only if x = y and x 6= y; x>yif and only if xi >y i
(i =1 ,...,n).
4A1 implies that labour is indispensable to produce any non-negative output
vector; A2 states that any non-negative commodity vector is producible as a
net output; and A3 is a free disposal condition for the production possibility
set, which states that, given any feasible production process α,a n yv e c t o r
producing (weakly) less net output than α is also feasible using the same
amount of labour as α itself.
Given P, the following notation is used:
P (α0 = l) ≡ {(−α0,−α,α) ∈ P | α0 = l},
b P (α0 = l) ≡ {b α ∈ R
n | ∃α =( −l,−α,α) ∈ P s.t. α − α = b α},
S b P (α0 = l) ≡
n
b α ∈ b P (α0 = l) | @b α
0 ∈ b P (α0 = l) s.t. b α
0 ≥ b α
o
,
where P (α0 = l) is the set of production vectors which use l units of labour as
an input, b P (α0 = l) is the corresponding set of net outputs, and S b P (α0 = l)
is the set of net outputs that can be produced eﬃciently using exactly l units
of labour. Further, for any set S ⊆ Rn, the set ∂S ≡ {x ∈ S | @x0 ∈ S s.t. x0 >x }
is the frontier of S and
◦
S≡ S\∂S is its interior.
The von Neumann model with joint production (analysed, among the
others, by Matsuo [7]) is a special case of the convex cone technology. Let
A be an n × m non-negative matrix with input coeﬃcients aij = 0 for any
i =1 ,...,n, j =1 ,...,m,a n dB be an n × m non-negative matrix with
output coeﬃcients bij = 0 for any i =1 ,...,n, j =1 ,...,m.M o r e o v e r ,l e t
L be a positive 1 × m vector with labour input coeﬃcients Lj > 0 for any
j =1 ,...,m. To be precise, the von Neumann economy is a particular type
of P,d e n o t e da sP(A,B,L), which can be described as follows
P(A,B,L) ≡
©




+ | ∃x ∈ R
m
+ : α0 = Lx & (−α,α) 5 (−Ax,Bx)
ª
.
This P(A,B,L) is a closed convex cone in R− × Rn
− × Rn
+ with 0 ∈ P(A,B,L).
Moreover, P(A,B,L) is easily shown to satisfy Assumptions 1-3.
2.2 Agents
In the standard two-class model used to analyse the FMT, the economy
consists of a set K of capitalists and of a set W of workers. The set of agents
N, with generic element ν,i st h e r e f o r eg i v e nb yN = K∪W. To be speciﬁc,
let ων ∈ Rn
+ denote the vector of initial productive endowments of agent
ν ∈ N: the working class W is the set of agents with no initial endowments,
5while the capitalist class K is the set of agents endowed with some non-
negative and non-zero amount of inputs. Thus, W = {ν ∈ N | ων = 0} and
K = {ν ∈ N | ων ≥ 0}.2
Each capitalist can operate any activity of the technology P and is as-
sumed to maximise proﬁts. For the sake of simplicity, capitalists are also
assumed to save all revenues, which are invested in the next production pe-
riod, and to supply no labour (e.g., they can be assumed to derive inﬁnite
disutility from labour). Each worker is endowed with one unit of labour,
which is assumed to be homogenous - there is no skill heterogeneity among
workers.3 Let bν denote the consumption bundle of worker ν and let lν de-
note the labour performed by ν. In what follows, we consider both economies
with bν = b for all ν ∈ W and economies in which workers choose diﬀerent
bundles. In order to focus on the essential structure of Matsuo’s approach,
we assume that lν = l,a l lν ∈ W .
In Matsuo’s [7] subjectivist framework, the deﬁnition of exploitation re-
quires the speciﬁcation of the agents’ (more precisely, the workers’) util-
ity functions. Thus, for every ν ∈ W, uν : R
n+1
+ → R is the utility
function representing ν’s preference over consumption and leisure. Given
c ∈ Rn




+ | uν (c0) >u ν (c)
ª
. A convex cone economy is given by
al i s tE = hK,W;(uν)ν∈W ;P;(ων)ν∈Ki, and the set of all such economies is
denoted by E. Finally, given a market economy, any price system is denoted
by p ∈ Rn
+ , which gives one price for each of the n commodities. Moreover,
the nominal wage rate is assumed to be positive and equal to unity.
2In principle, one might argue that the appropriate deﬁnition of workers and capitalists
relates to their ﬁnancial wealth, rather than their vector of endowments. If this view is
adopted, then W = {ν ∈ N | pων =0 } and K = {ν ∈ N | pων > 0}. This distinction is
relevant only if p ≯ 0 and it does not make any signiﬁcant diﬀerence for the results of this
paper.
3The presence of heterogeneous labour does raise important issues in exploitation the-
ory, including on the relation between exploitation and proﬁts (for a discussion, see, e.g.,
[6]). Yet, this issue is not relevant in the comparison between objectivist and subjectivist
approaches, which is the central theme of this paper. In his subjectivist approach to
exploitation, [7] also assumes homogeneous labour (see Assumption 3).
63 A Strongly Subjectivist Approach to Ex-
ploitation
Matsuo [7] only considers the rather special case of von Neumann economies
with identical workers. Given the emphasis on individual preferences, the
representative agent setting seems unduly restrictive and in this section his
analysis is generalised to convex economies with heterogeneous agents.
In Matsuo’s framework, workers’ preferences do not play a merely sub-
sidiary, or indirect role (e.g., in determining consumption and leisure choices):
utility functions play a direct, deﬁnitional role. Consider ﬁrst the deﬁnition
of labour values and the value of labour power. Matsuo [7] deﬁnes the labour
value of a vector b referring to the notion of Minimised Labour for Equal
Utility (MLEU): the labour value of bundle b corresponds to the minimum
amount of labour necessary to produce another bundle c as net output, which
g i v e sa tl e a s tt h es a m eu t i l i t ya sb. Formally, let C denote the set of con-
tinuous functions. For the sake of simplicity, and without loss of generality,
assume that leisure does not enter the workers’ utility functions, so that for
every agent ν ∈ W, uν : Rn
+ → R is the utility function representing worker
ν’s preference over consumption. The equivalent of Matsuo’s ([7]) Assump-
tion 2 in a general framework with heterogeneous agents can then be written
as follows.4
Assumption (A4).F o re a c hν ∈ W, uν ∈ U,w h e r eU = {uν ∈ C|c0 ≥ c ⇒
uν(c0) >u ν(c)}.
In other words, each worker’s utility function is continuous and strictly in-
creasing (in the ﬁrst n arguments).
L e tu si n t r o d u c eM a t s u o ’ sn o t i o no fMinimised Labour for Equal Utility
(MLEU)a sf o l l o w s .
Deﬁnition 1: For a given uν ∈ U, the labour value of vector b according to
4Leisure is not included in utility functions for notational simplicity and conceptual
clarity. First, although [7] assumes that workers have preferences over leisure, this assump-
tion plays no role at all in his argument and indeed he imposes no restriction whatsoever
concerning the eﬀect of leisure on welfare. Second, if leisure is included in the utility
function some conceptual issues arise concerning the deﬁnition of labour value (see the
next footnote). Finally, the introduction of leisure in the utility functions would leave all
the theoretical arguments and formal results in this paper unchanged.













Denote the solution of the above problem by αuν (b): the labour value of b
w.r.t. uν is deﬁned as αuν
0 (b).5 Two crucial properties of Matsuo’s subjec-
tivist deﬁnition of the labour content of a bundle b are immediately apparent
from Deﬁnition 1: ﬁrst, the concept of labour value depends on subjective
preferences, and if agents are heterogenous in principle there is no unique
value of b.6 Second, in this approach, the notion of labour value becomes
more and more abstract and far from the productive conditions of the econ-
omy.
Based on Deﬁnition 1, the concept of MLEU-exploitation of an agent ν
consuming bνand supplying l can be speciﬁed.
Deﬁnition 2: (i) Given uν ∈ U,w o r k e rν ∈ W is MLEU-exploited w.r.t.
uν if and only if l − αuν
0 (bν) > 0. (ii) Further, worker ν ∈ W is MLEU-
exploited if and only if l − αuν
0 (bν) > 0 for all uν ∈ U.
If a representative agent is assumed, uν = u for all ν ∈ W,a n dD e ﬁnitions 1
and 2 should be modiﬁed accordingly by replacing αuν
0 (b) with αu
0 (b).
Deﬁnitions 1 and 2 represent the core of Matsuo’s approach. Because
the condition in Deﬁnition 2(ii) must hold for all uν ∈ U, and the existence
of exploitation can be proved regardless of the speciﬁc uν,h em a i n t a i n s
that “This causes this condition to be objective” ([7], p.260). This claim
is misleading: although the existence of exploitation may be independent of
5In [7] leisure is included in workers’ utility functions, which are also assumed to be
identical, and thus the relevant constraint in ML is written as u(c,l) ≥ u(b,l),w h e r e
l is the amount of labour expended by workers to be able to buy b. As already noted,
the inclusion of labour has no relevance for the formal results. Yet, from a theoretical
viewpoint, it seems arbitrary to keep labour constant at l in the left-hand-side of the
constraint. It is not at all clear why the amount of labour in workers’ utility functions
should remain constant even at the new allocation c.
6Interestingly, in the economy with P = P(A,B,L), Matsuo ([7], Deﬁnition 3) deﬁnes
a “Narrow Eﬀective Range of Value” as the set of strictly positive vectors t such that
t(B − A) 5 L.T h ev e c t o r st seem the generalisation of the standard vector of embodied
labour t = L(I − A)−1 of the Leontief technology, and they only depend on the objective
features of the economy relating to the conditions of production. In this framework, it
w o u l dt h e ns e e mn a t u r a lt od e ﬁne the labour value of a bundle c as tc.Y e tt h e yp l a yn o
essential role in Matsuo’s ([7]) analysis.
8the speciﬁc uν ∈ U, the labour value of a bundle does depend on the speciﬁc
uν and the value of labour power cannot be deﬁned without knowing uν .
If workers are heterogeneous, the inherently subjective dimension of Mat-
suo’s approach, and a number of problematic features, are particularly clear
when it comes to the construction of an aggregate index of exploitation.
Consider an economy with preferences (uν)ν∈W and consumption bundles
(bν)ν∈W.L e t β ≡
P
ν∈W bν denote aggregate workers’ consumption. Sup-
pose, for the sake of argument, that an aggregate subjectivist exploitation
index could be constructed: if agents are heterogeneous and consume dif-
ferent bundles, a permutation of their bundles, leaving β and the preference
proﬁle unchanged, will lead in general to changes in the individual and aggre-
gate exploitation indices. This is extremely counterintuitive in exploitation
theory, especially given that workers work the same amount of time and earn
t h es a m ei n c o m e .
More importantly, it is unclear that a meaningful index can be con-
structed in the general case: the aggregate level of exploitation cannot be
consistently determined by knowing only β, because there is an inherent inde-
terminacy in the deﬁnition of the economy-wide labour value of β. Therefore
one would have to start from individual exploitation indices (or the individ-
ual αuν
0 (bν)’s) and ﬁnd a consistent way of aggregating them. Yet, while the
individual index of exploitation of worker ν,w h ow o r k sl and consumes bν,
relative to uν,c a nb ed e ﬁned as euν (bν,l)=
l−αuν
0 (bν)
l , there is no obvious way
of aggregating the diﬀerent indices euν (bν,l) into an economy-wide measure




. Actually, this is
true even if all workers consume the same bundle, and some deep ambiguity
seems inherent in this subjectivist approach, unless a representative worker
is assumed, in which case e(b,l,u)=eu (b,l).
These problems undermine the positive and normative signiﬁcance of
Matsuo’s subjectivist approach. To be sure, one may object that the main
purpose of exploitation theory is to diagnose the existence of exploitation,
whereas the construction of an exploitation index is not essential. This de-
fence is unconvincing, because it impl i e st h a ti ti si m p o s s i b l et oc o m p a r e
diﬀerent societies based on the amount of exploitation suﬀered by workers,
nor is it meaningful to analyse the dynamics of exploitation of a society over
time.
Indeed, even if a representative agent is assumed, so that a subjectivist
exploitation index can be deﬁned, not much can be said about the degree of
9exploitation in an economy, apart from diagnosing its existence. Theorem 1
precisely characterises this deep, additional indeterminacy. As a preliminary
step, let EH ⊂ E be the subset of economies such that any E ∈ EH has a




⊂ EH denotes a
subset of economies with the same objective features, hK,W;P;(ων)ν∈Ki,
and a representative agent but potentially diﬀerent preferences.
Theorem 1: (i) For any E ∈ EH, αu
0 (b)=l for all u ∈ U if and only if









⊂ EH such that for all δ > 0 and
all ε ∈ [0,1] there is a function u ∈ U,s u c ht h a t|eu(b,l) − ε| < δ.




, then for all α0 ∈ P such that
α0
0 5 α0 = l, b α
0 5 b α = b and if α0
0 < α0,t h e nb α
0 ≤ b α.B u t t h e n , ( A 4 )
implies that αu




,t h e n
obviously αu
0 (b) 6= l for some u ∈ U. Suppose that there is b0 6= b such that




. Then, there exist i,j: b0
i >b i and b0
j <b j.F u r t h e r ,




for all λ ∈ [0,1],s i n c eP is convex. Consider
Up ≡ {u ∈ U|u(c)=
Pn
i=1 δici, δi > 0,
Pn
i=1 δi =1 }.T h e r e i s a l w a y s u ∈
Up such that u(e b) >u (b) for any λ ∈ (0,1],a n dt h e r e f o r eαu
0 (b) < l.



























and l =1 . Then, as in part (i), consider Up and deﬁne
the inﬁnite sequence {ut(c)}
∞
t=0 ⊂ Up with ut(c) ≡ δtc1 +( 1− δt)c2,w h e r e
δt ∈ (0,1), for all t. Since eut(b,1) = 1 − αut
0 (b), αut
0 (b) → 0 as δt → 0,a n d
thus eut(b,1) → 1,w h e r e a sαut
0 (b) → 1 as δt → 1, and thus eut(b,1) → 0.






a Reproducible Solution as deﬁned by Roemer ([13] and [14]; see also the
next section) associated with π = 1
2. At this reproducible solution, Ax = ω,
(B − A)x ≥ b, Lx =1 ,a n dpb =1 .
10By Theorem 1(i), even if workers are identical, and thus no aggregation
issue arises, the exploitation index will be invariant to changes in workers’
preferences only in the rather special case that there exists a certain amount
of labour input such that the wage basket lies on the corresponding produc-
tion possibility frontier, and the latter corresponds to a single point. Theo-
rem 1(ii) has an even more puzzling implication: even if workers are identical,
there are economies in which it is literally impossible in principle to say any-
thing about exploitation, except whether it exists. In fact, for a given set of
objective characteristics of the economy, the amount of exploitation suﬀered
by each worker can take any value provided the appropriate utility function
is chosen. By simply changing workers’ subjective preferences, the economy
moves from being essentially non-exploitative, to being plagued by the most
extreme form of exploitation. In this kind of situation, the exploitation index
is not just inaccurate, it is meaningless.7
By focusing on a simple von Neumann technology, the following example
forcefully illustrates the implications of Theorem 1, if the condition in Part
(i) is violated, so that there exist two economies E,E0 ∈ EH,s u c ht h a t









, (ων)ν∈K =( ω0ν)ν∈K, but
eu(b,l) 6= eu0(b,l).
Example 1: Consider the following von Neumann production technology






















. It can easily be shown that





constitute a Reproducible Solution as deﬁned by
Roemer ([13] and [14]; see also the next section) associated with the maximal
proﬁtr a t eπ = 1
2.M o r e o v e r ,[B − A]x = bLx and Ax 5 ω. Finally, pb =1 .
7It is worth noting in passing that Matsuo defends his subjectivist approach by arguing
that “exploitation is a matter of alienation” ([7], p.263), that is, it derives from the workers’
“exclusion from decision making on the production allocation of the society” ([7], p.263).
This argument seems false, for in Matsuo’s framework, exploitation would be eliminated if
capitalists continued to organise production but workers received the whole of net product.
It is also arguably misleading, if not conceptually inappropriate, to conﬂate two distinct
phenomena.






follows that b =a r g m a x py0=1 u(y0).T h u s , i f u is interpreted as represent-
ing standard subjective preferences over consumption (as in the neoclassical
theory of consumer behavior), the vector b can be interpreted as the work-
er’s Marshallian demand which is purchased under the budget constraint
py0 =1 . In contrast, it follows from Deﬁnition 1 that αu


















. Hence, since 1 − Le x>0,t h ew o r k e ri sMLEU-exploited w.r.t.














Insert Figures 1 and 2 around here.
In other words, U (b;u) ) U (b;u0). In this case, b =a r g m a x py0=1 u0 (y0)
holds. Thus, again, if we interpret u0 as representing a standard subjective
preference of the worker over consumption such as in the neoclassical the-
ory of consumers behavior, the vector b can be interpreted as the worker’s
Marshallian demand which is purchased under the budget constraint py0 =1 .
Note that it can easily be shown that 1−Le x0 > 0 still holds, and so the worker
is MLEU-exploited w.r.t. u0. However, now, αu0











,s ot h a te y0 ≡ [B − A]e x0 > e y.
Hence, although the worker’s conditions are unchanged, because she provides
one unit of labour and receive one unit of wage revenue per day, her ‘exploita-
tion rate’ would decrease if her subjective preferences changed from u to u0.
4 The subjectivist approach and the FMT
In this section, the assumption l =1is made, without loss of generality. Mat-
suo [7] insists that exploitation derives from the workers’ lack of control over
production processes, and if workers could access all production processes,
they would not be exploited and would reach a higher utility. According to




ν (b α) s.t. b α ∈ R
n
+ and α0 5 1.
12The solution of the above problem can be denoted by αuν
max, and its corre-
sponding utility value by uuν
max, which reduce to αu
max and uu
max, respectively,
if a representative agent is assumed.
Theorem 2 generalises Matsuo’s ([7]) ‘Weak System of Exploitation The-
ory’ (WSET) in two important directions: ﬁrst, it allows for heterogenous
workers’ preferences, even if workers consume a given subsistence bundle;
second, the equivalence results are shown to hold in general convex cone
economies.
Theorem 2 (The Generalised WSET): For any economy E ∈ E,w h e r eb is
t h ew a g eb u n d l e ,t h ef o l l o w i n gs t a t e m e n t sa r ee q u i v a l e n t :
(1) b ∈ b P (α0 =1 )\S b P (α0 =1 ) ;
(2) For each ν ∈ W, 1 − αuν
0 (b) > 0 holds for each uν ∈ U;
(3) For each ν ∈ W, uν (b) < uuν
max holds for each uν ∈ U;
(4) @p ∈ Rn
++ s.t. p[b α − b] 5 0 holds for all b α ∈ S b P (α0 =1 ) .
Proof. 1. First, we prove that (1)⇔(2).
(⇒):L e tb ∈ b P (α0 =1 )\S b P (α0 =1 ) . Then, by deﬁnition of b P (α0 =1 ) ,
it needs at most one unit of labour to produce b as a net output. Since
b ∈ b P (α0 =1 )\S b P (α0 =1 ) ,t h e r ee x i s t sα ∈ P such that b α ∈ S b P (α0 =1 )
and b α ≥ b. Then, for each uν ∈ U, uν (b α) >u ν (b) holds. Then, we can
ﬁnd c ∈ b P (α0 =1 )\S b P (α0 =1 )such that b α ≥ c ≥ b. Then, again, for any
uν ∈ U, uν (c) >u ν (b) holds, and c ∈ U (b;uν).S i n c e U (b;uν) is an open
set for each uν, then there is an open neighbourhood N (c) of c such that
N (c) ⊆ U (b;uν). Thus, there is c0 ∈
◦
b P (α0 =1 )such that c0 ∈ U (b;uν) and
there is α0 ∈ P such that α0 − α0 ≥ c0 and α0
0 < 1. Hence it follows from
Deﬁnition 1 that 1 − αuν
0 (b) > 0. This reasoning holds for each uν ∈ U.
(⇐):S u p p o s e b ∈ S b P (α0 =1 ) . Then, there exists a suitable uν ∈ U
which satisﬁes U (b;uν)∩ b P (α0 =1 )=∅. This implies, by the continuity of
uν, αuν
0 (b)=1 . Suppose b/ ∈ b P (α0 =1 ) . Then, again, there exists a suitable
uν ∈ U which satisﬁes U (b;uν)∩ b P (α0 =1 )=∅, which implies αuν
0 (b) = 1.
2. Next, we prove that (1) ⇔ (3).
(⇒):L e tb ∈ b P (α0 =1 )\S b P (α0 =1 ) . Then, for any uν ∈ U,t h e r ee x i s t s
cuν ∈ S b P (α0 =1 )such that uν ¡
cuν¢
>u ν (b) holds. Note, for any uν ∈ U,
uuν
max = uν ¡
cuν¢
holds. Thus, for any uν ∈ U, uν (b) < uuν
max.
(⇐):S u p p o s e b ∈ S b P (α0 =1 ) . Then, there exists a suitable uν ∈ U
such that uuν
max = uν (b). Suppose b/ ∈ b P (α0 =1 ) . Then, there exists a
13suitable uν ∈ U which satisﬁes U (b;uν) ∩ b P (α0 =1 )=∅,w h i c hi m p l i e s
uν (b) = uuν
max.
3. Finally, we prove that (1) ⇔ (4).
(⇒):L e tb ∈ b P (α0 =1 )\S b P (α0 =1 ) . Then there is α ∈ P such that
b α ∈ S b P (α0 =1 )and b α ≥ b and p[b α − b] > 0 for all p ∈ Rn
++ .
(⇐):I f b ∈ S b P (α0 =1 ) ,t h e r ei sp ∈ Rn
++ such that for all b α ∈
S b P (α0 =1 ) , p[b α − b] 5 0, a contradiction. If b/ ∈ b P (α0 =1 ) ,l e tX (b) ≡ n
b α − b | b α ∈ b P (α0 =1 )
o
.S i n c e b/ ∈ b P (α0 =1 ) ,t h e nX (b) ∩ Rn
+ = ∅.I n
fact, if there exists x ∈ X (b)∩Rn
+, this implies that there is b α
0 ∈ b P (α0 =1 )
such that b α
0 − b = x = 0. Then, by A3, b ∈ b P (α0 =1 )holds, which
is a contradiction. Thus, by the separating hyperplane theorem, there is
p∗ ∈ Rn\{0} such that for any x = b α − b ∈ X (b), p∗ [b α − b] < 0.M o r e o v e r ,
since the hyperplane associated with p∗ separates X (b) and Rn
+, p∗ ≥ 0 holds
by Nikaido [11; Theorem 30.1]. If p∗ / ∈ Rn
++ ,t a k ea n o t h e rp0 ∈ Rn
++ which is
suﬃciently close to p∗. Then, p0 [b α − b] < 0 still holds for all b α ∈ b P (α0 =1 ) ,
since p[b α − b] is continuous at p∗ for each b α ∈ b P (α0 =1 ) , and a contradiction
obtains.
Theorem 2 proves that (2) every worker in the economy is MLEU-
exploited if and only if (1) her consumption bundle b can be produced with
less than the one unit of labour that she has supplied. In turn, the latter
holds if and only if (3) workers do not get their maximum utility (for any
continuous and strictly increasing utility function). All these conditions are
equivalent to (4) the existence of strictly positive proﬁts for each strictly pos-
itive price vector. Matsuo’s main Theorem follows as a corollary of Theorem
2, in the special case of von Neumann technology and identical preferences.
Corollary 1: For any economy E ∈ E,w i t hP = P(A,B,L) for some (A,B,L),
the following statements are equivalent:
(1) @p ∈ Rn
++ s.t. p[B − A − bL] 5 0;
(2) ∃x ∈ Rm
+ s.t. [B − A − bL]x ≥ 0;
(3) For each ν ∈ W, 1 − αuν
0 (b) > 0 holds for each uν ∈ U;
(4) For each ν ∈ W, uν (b) < uuν
max holds for each uν ∈ U.
Theorem 2 does generalise the core result of Matsuo’s subjectivist ap-
proach, but it also highlights its limits and problematic implications. First,
14Theorem 2 does not hold if workers are allowed to consume diﬀerent bun-
dles. In particular, for a given β =
P
ν∈W bν, if the assumption bν = b for
all ν ∈ W is dropped, then even if
β
N ∈ b P (α0 =1 )\S b P (α0 =1 ) , conditions
(2) and (3) do not necessarily hold. The equivalence is restored if condition
(1) is written as bν ∈ b P (α0 =1 )\S b P (α0 =1 )for all ν ∈ W. But the latter
condition is theoretically ad hoc and empirically questionable as it focuses
on the production conditions of arbitrary individual wage bundles.
In principle, one might try to restore the equivalence in Theorem 2 by
replacing the analysis of individual workers in (2) and (3) with a focus on
some aggregate exploitation index. As argued above, however, in general
economies with heterogeneous workers consuming diﬀerent bundles, it is diﬃ-
cult to construct an aggregate exploitation index that is meaningful and fully
consistent with strong subjectivism. Therefore it is unclear that a strongly
subjectivist approach can actually deal with general economies with hetero-
geneous agents.
Alternatively, one might insist that, even if workers have diﬀerent prefer-
ences, it is consistent with the traditional Marxian view to assume that they
consume the same subsistence bundle. Or perhaps, one might argue that a
representative agent framework is theoretically appropriate in exploitation
theory. In either case, Theorem 2 does generalise the WSET, even though
it is important to note that the representative agent assumption is not an
innocuous technical condition. Yet, even in these simpliﬁed cases, it is un-
clear that this subjectivist approach provides a satisfactory treatment of the
FMT. Theorem 2 only focuses on strictly positive price vectors, but this is
rather restrictive, as there are many cases in which the equilibrium price
vector is only semipositive. Proposition 1 proves that, for any semipositive
price vector if proﬁts are positive, then the economy is MLEU-exploitative.
Proposition 1: For any economy E ∈ E ,i f((p,1),α) is a pair of a
semipositive price vector and a social production point such that b α = α0b,
for a given wage bundle b,a n dp r o ﬁts are positive, then 1 − αuν
0 (b) > 0, for
all ν ∈ W,f o ra n y(uν)ν∈W such that uν ∈ U .
Proof. Let ((p,1),α) be a price vector and a social production point such
that b α = α0b and pb α − α0 > 0.L e t α∗ ≡ α/α0. Then, pb α
∗ − 1 > 0
and b α
∗ = b.B y d e ﬁnition, b α
∗ ∈ b P (α0 =1 ) .S i n c e b α
∗ = b, it follows that
b ∈ b P (α0 =1 )\S b P (α0 =1 )or b α
∗ = b.S i n c epb α
∗ − 1 > 0 for pb =1 , b α
∗ = b
is impossible, so that b ∈ b P (α0 =1 )\S b P (α0 =1 )holds. By Theorem 2, the
15desired result is obtained.
Theorem 2, however, does not rule out the possibility that p[b α − b] 5 0
holds for some p ≥ 0 even when condition (2) holds, i.e. that exploitation
occurs without positive proﬁts, contradicting the FMT. The next two results
establish that the FMT is indeed violated under two standard deﬁnitions of
equilibrium.
Consider, ﬁrst, von Neumann’s concept of balanced growth equilibrium.
Assume wages to be advanced and let pb =1 .
Deﬁnition 3 [17]: A balanced growth equilibrium (BGE) for the economy
E ∈ E with P = P(A,B,L) is a tuple ((p,1),x,π),w h e r ep ∈ Rn
+ , x ∈ Rm
+ ,
and π > −1 such that:
(a) pB 5 (1 + π)[pA + L];
(b) Bx = (1 + π)[A + bL]x;
(c) pBx > 0.
In Deﬁnition 3, (a) is the revenue-cost condition for each production process
in equilibrium, which implies that, given competition among production
processes, in equilibrium no capitalist can gain more than the warranted
proﬁtr a t eπ from operating any production process. Note that the warranted
proﬁtr a t eπ is the minimal value of the (uniform) proﬁtr a t ew a r r a n t e df o r
all production processes in equilibrium. In contrast, (b) is the demand and
supply condition for each capital and/or consumption good, which implies
that in the equilibrium, the demand of any capital or consumption goods
used for the next production period, (1 + π)[A + bL]x, does not exceed the
supply of those goods, Bx,p r o d u c e di nt h i sp e r i o d .H e r e ,π represents the
maximum growth rate of the economy. Finally, condition (c) implies that
the total market value of output should be positive, which eliminates trivial
equilibria with no production.
T h en e x tr e s u l tp r o v e st h a tt h eF M Td o e sn o th o l di nM a t s u o ’ ss u b j e c -
tivist approach, in the von Neumann balanced growth equilibrium.
Theorem 3: There is an economy E ∈ E with P = P(A,B,L) and bν = b for
all ν, in which at any BGE,t h ec o r r e s p o n d i n gwarranted proﬁtr a t eis zero
while MLEU-exploitation exists.
Proof. 1. Consider a von Neumann production technology (A,B,L) and a

















In this case, regardless of the distribution of capital endowment (ων)ν∈K,t h e
















To show this, let p =( 0 ,1). First of all, note that pb =1 . Then,
since p[B − A]=( 1 ,1) and πpA +( 1+π)L = π(1,1) + (1 + π)(1,1),t h e















it follows that since π =0then Deﬁnition 3(b) holds. Finally, for any
((p,1),x,π) ∈ BGE(A,B,L,b), pBx > 0,s ot h a tD e ﬁnition 3(c) holds. Thus, if
((p,1),x,π) ∈ BGE(A,B,L,b),t h e ni tc o n s t i t u t e saB G E .
2. Let us examine whether there is another BGE. First of all, it is im-
mediate to show that if ((p00,1),x 00,π00) constitutes a BGE, then π00 =0





π00p00A +( 1+π00)L =( 1 ,1).S i n c e p00
1 + p00
2 =1by pb =1 , it follows that
p00 [B − A]=( 1 ,p 00
1 +1 ) .T h u s ,i f((p00,1),x 00,π00) constitutes a BGE, p00
1 =0
holds from Deﬁnition 3(a). Therefore, if ((p00,1),x 00,π00) constitutes a BGE,
then ((p00,1),x 00,π00) ∈ BGE(A,B,L,b).
3 . T h ea b o v ea r g u m e n ti m p l i e st h a ti nt h i se c o n o m y ,t h ew a r r a n t e d
proﬁtr a t ei sz e r oa te v e r yB G E .H e n c e ,i fD e ﬁnition 2 is adopted and the
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∈ b P (α0 =1 )\S b P (α0 =1 ) . Hence, by Theorem 2,
for any uν ∈ U, 1−αuν
0 (b) > 0. This implies that MLEU-exploitation exists
and the FMT does not hold in this economy.
17Consider a diﬀerent equilibrium concept, namely that of reproducible solu-
tion proposed by Roemer ([13], [14]). It is assumed that capitalists maximise
proﬁt s ,s u b j e c tt ot h ec o n s t r a i n tt h a tt h e ym u s tb ea b l et ol a y o u tt h eo p e r -
ating costs of capital in advance, whereas wages are paid out at the end of
the production process. Formally, assuming stationary expectations on prices
([13]), capitalist ν’ sp r o g r a m m ei sg i v e nb y :
choose α








The set of production processes that are the optimal solutions of the above
problem is denoted by Aν (p,w). Then:
Deﬁnition 4 ([13], [14]): A reproducible solution (RS) for an economy




,w h e r ep ∈ Rn
+ and αν ∈ P for all ν ∈ K,
such that:
(a) ∀ν ∈ K, αν ∈ Aν (p,1) (proﬁt maximisation);
(b) b α = α0b (reproducibility),
where b α ≡
P




(c) α 5 ω (availability of capital), where α ≡
P
ν∈N αν and ω ≡
P
ν∈K ων;
(d) pb =1(subsistence wage).
In other words, at a RS, (a) capitalists maximise proﬁts; (b) aggregate out-
put is suﬃcient to replace capital used up and for workers’ consumption,
and (c) aggregate capital is suﬃcient for production plans. Part (d) is the






ν∈W lν 5 |W| (which is a standard assumption in Marx-
ian economics).8
The next theorem proves that if Matsuo’s deﬁnition of exploitation is
adopted, the FMT does not hold at a RS of the economy.
Theorem 4: There is an economy E ∈ E such that at a RS the maximal
proﬁtr a t eis zero,w h i l eMLEU-exploitation exists.
Proof. Consider the same von Neumann production technology (A,B,L)
and the same bundle of wage goods b as in the proof of Theorem 3. Let
8For a more detailed discussion of the notion of Reproducible Solution, see [13] and
[14].





,a l lν ∈ K,s ot h a t
P






Assume that |K| ≤ |W|. First, it is not diﬃcult to prove that p =( 0 ,1) is
a competitive equilibrium price for this economy. In fact, it is immediate to










then xν ∈ Aν (p,1), for all ν ∈ K,w i t hAxν = ων, (B − A)xν = b,
and Lxν =1 ,a l lν ∈ K. Therefore, noting that |K| ≤ |W|, it follows
that
P
ν∈K Lxν ≤ |W|,
P
ν∈K (B − A)xν =
P
ν∈K Lxνb,a n d
P
ν∈K Axν = P
ν∈K ων. Finally, pb =1so that Deﬁnition 4-(d) is also satisﬁed.
Second, because b ∈ b P (α0 =1 )\S b P (α0 =1 ) , the desired result follows
from Theorem 2.
Theorems 3 and 4 raise serious doubts concerning the strongly subjectivist
approach to exploitation, and its relation with the FMT. Matsuo proposed
this approach precisely in order to rescue Marxian exploitation theory from
Petri’s [12] counterexample, which shows that although Morishima’s ([10])
Generalised FMT is robust in BGEs, the FMT does not hold in general if
other equilibrium notions (such as Roemer’s RS) are considered: proﬁts can
be positive even though no exploitation exists in the sense of [10]. Proposition
1 shows that Petri’s counterexample can be resolved if Deﬁnition 2 is adopted:
for any nonnegative price vector, if proﬁts are positive, MLEU-exploitation
exists. This is not really a solution of Petri’s puzzle, however, because The-
orem 3 states that if Matsuo’s approach is adopted, the FMT does not hold
even at a BGE. From this perspective, his subjectivist approach seems to
score worse than Morishima’s deﬁnition, rather than solving its diﬃculties.
In sum, if workers are heterogeneous and consume diﬀerent bundles, the
WSET cannot be generalised. Further, even if one assumes workers to con-
sume the same bundle, the strongly subjectivist approach to exploitation
does not preserve - let alone generalise - the relation between exploitation
and proﬁts, and the FMT is violated, contrary to Matsuo’s claims.
As a ﬁnal remark, it is worth noting that, even setting aside the doubts
related to Theorems 3 and 4 above, the claims concerning the generality of
the results are unwarranted, even if a representative worker is assumed. Al-
though the class of utility functions in U is rather large, some important cases
are excluded (for instance, perfect complements, lexicographic preferences,
neutral goods), and this exclusion is puzzling if the motivation of the whole
exercise is to provide a general framework that avoids counterexamples to
the FMT: given the restrictions on U,i ti sn o td i ﬃcult to build new coun-
19terexamples using utility functions outside U. For instance, if preferences
are perfect complements, then the equivalence result breaks down. So, if
the approach is to be defended, this is not on the grounds of its presumed
generality. One would have to argue directly that it is theoretically superior.
Matsuo defends the strict monotonicity assumption against one speciﬁc
critique, namely against the claim that workers may not derive welfare from
accumulation goods. However, on the one hand, this does not respond to
cases such as perfect complements or lexicographic preferences. On the
other hand, to postulate that “workers have some preference for accumu-
lation goods if they - even unconsciously - have some ideas about a desirable
production allocation in the society” ([7], p.263) is arguably rather ad hoc
and objectionable. And it implies that an approach that aims to provide a
general theory of exploitation, which is robust to counterexamples, ultimately
rests on a purely empirical assumption.
5 An objectivist approach to exploitation
The previous sections raise several doubts on Matsuo’s approach, but they do
not provide a complete answer to the issue of whether, and how, subjective
preferences should play a role in exploitation theory. A thorough analyis of
this issue goes beyond the limits of this paper, but some important points
can be made, which point out some interesting lines for further research.
First, the previous arguments forcefully suggest that an approach in which
subjective preferences directly enter the deﬁnition of value has a number
of undesirable properties. More precisely, they support the view that some
minimal objectivism is necessary, whereby if all the objective features of two
economies are identical, their aggregate exploitation indices should also be
identical, regardless of agents’ subjective preferences.
Axiom 1 (Minimal objectivism): Let E = hK,W;(uν)ν∈W ;P;(ων)ν∈Ki
and E0 = hK0,W0;(u0ν)ν∈W0 ;P0;(ω0ν)ν∈K0i be such that K = K0, W =










To be sure, there are a number of deﬁnitions satisfying Axiom 1 and the
axiom is silent concerning many controversial issues in exploitation theory.
For example, it may be argued that Axiom 1 should be strengthened to
exclude all possible inﬂuences, direct and indirect, of subjective preferences
20and even individual choices from the analysis of exploitation. Yet, it does
restrict the admissible deﬁn i t i o n sa n di tc a nb es e e na st h eﬁrst step of a
novel axiomatic analysis of preference and choice in exploitation theory.
Second, in the rest of this section an objectivist approach is considered,
which provides more satisfactory answers to the two core issues analysed in
this paper, namely the construction of a robust exploitation index and the
validity of the FMT in general economies. Given an economy E ∈ E,l e t ¡
α,(bν)ν∈W
¢
be an allocation such that α ∈ P, b α ∈ Rn
+ , and let p ∈ Rn
+ be
the associated price vector. Let B (p,l) ≡
©
c ∈ Rn
+ | pc = l
ª
: B (p,l) is the
set of bundles that can be aﬀorded by workers who supply l units of labour.
Note bν ∈ B (p,l) for all ν ∈ W. Then, consider c ∈ B (p,l) such that c = tb α
for some t>0.D e n o t es u c ht>0 by t(p,l,α).




be an allocation such that,
α ∈ P, b α ∈ Rn
+ , lν = l,a l lν ∈ W, and let (p,1) ∈ R
n+1
+ be the associated
price vector. Every worker ν ∈ W is exploited if and only if l−t(p,l,α)α0 > 0.
Deﬁnition 5 is conceptually related to the ‘New Interpretation’ ([1]; [2];
[3]) and t(p,l,α)α0 can be interpreted as the value of labour power. Therefore,
as in the ‘New Interpretation’, workers are exploited if and only if the share
o fw a g e si nn a t i o n a li n c o m ei sl e s st h a no n e .D e ﬁnition 5 is superior to the
subjectivist approach proposed by Matsuo in terms of providing a theoreti-
cally robust and empirically meaningful exploitation index. The deﬁnition of
the aggregate index of exploitation is straightforward and no aggregation is-






l .D e ﬁnition 5 satisﬁes Axiom 1 and the
latter index is well-deﬁned and uniquely determined, for any set of objective
characteristics of the economy, which allows meaningful comparisons across
time and between countries concerning exploitation, and - more generally -
fruitful empirical analysis in a Marxian framework.9
Deﬁnition 5 is also superior in terms of preserving the classical Marxian
insight concerning the relation between labour, exploitation, and proﬁts in
general convex cone economies with heterogeneous agents. In the rest of
this section, it is assumed that l =1 , without loss of generality, and t(p,α)
is used instead of t(p,1,α) for the sake of notational simplicity. Recall that
β =
P
ν∈W bν and let b =
β
|W|. Under Deﬁnition 5, the equivalent of Theorem
2 in economies with heterogeneous agents can be proved.
9For a discussion of the empirical implications of the ‘New Interpretation,’ see [8].
21Theorem 5 (The General System of an Objectivist Exploitation Theory):
For any economy E ∈ E, the following statements are equivalent:
(1) b ∈ b P (α0 =1 )\S b P (α0 =1 ) ;
(2) @p ∈ Rn
++ s.t. p[b α − b] 5 0 holds for all b α ∈ S b P (α0 =1 ) ;
(3) There exists α ∈ P (α0 =1 )s.t. for all p ∈ Rn
++ , 1 − t(p,α)α0 > 0.
Proof. By Theorem 2, it suﬃces to show (1)⇔(3). First, suppose that
(1) holds. Then, there exists α ∈ P (α0 =1 )such that b α ≥ b,b yA 2a n d
A3, and for all p ∈ Rn
++ , pb α >p b= pc for any c ∈ B (p,1).T h u s , f o r
t(p,α)b α ∈ B (p,1), pb α >p·t(p,α)b α, which implies 1−t(p,α)α0 > 0,s i n c eα0 =1 .
Next, suppose that (3) holds. Let α ∈ P (α0 =1 )be such that for all
p ∈ Rn
++ , 1 − t(p,α)α0 > 0.S u p p o s et h a tb α ≥ b does not hold. Then, there
exists p ∈ Rn
++ such that pb α 5 pb.T h u s ,s i n c ec ∈ B (p,1), pb α 5 pc,w h i c h
implies pb α 5 pt(p,α)b α,s ot h a tt(p,α) = 1. However, since 1 − t(p,α) > 0,t h i s
is a contradiction. Thus, (3) implies that there is α ∈ P (α0 =1 )such that
b α ≥ b, which implies b ∈ b P (α0 =1 )\S b P (α0 =1 )by A3 and the deﬁnition
of S b P (α0 =1 ) .
Theorem 5 states that (3) every worker in the economy is exploited in
the sense of Deﬁnition 5 (at some feasible allocation) if and only if (1) it is
possible to produce b with less than the one unit of labour supplied by each
worker. In turn, these two conditions are equivalent to (2) the existence of
strictly positive proﬁts for any strictly positive price vector. Furthermore,
it can be proved that the equivalent of Proposition 1 holds for Deﬁnition 5
and, unlike in Matsuo’s subjectivist approach, the next results show that the
FMT holds under standard deﬁnitions of equilibrium with p ≥ 0.
Theorem 6 states that, under Deﬁnition 5, the FMT holds if von Neu-
mann’s equilibrium concept is adopted.
Theorem 6: For any economy E ∈ E,w i t hP = P(A,B,L), at any BGE the
warranted proﬁtr a t eis positive if and only if every worker is exploited in
the sense of Deﬁnition 5.
Proof. Let π > 0. Then, pBx − [pA + L]x>0. Without loss of generality,
let x be normalised so that Lx =1holds. Then, given pb =1 ,t h ea b o v e
inequality is reduced to p[B − A]x>p b= t(p,x)p[B − A]x for some t(p,x) >
0.S i n c et(p,x) < 1, 1 − t(p,x)Lx =1− t(p,x) > 0 holds, so that every worker is
e x p l o i t e di nt e r m so fD e ﬁnition 5.
22Let π 5 0. Then, pBx − [pA + L]x 5 0. Again, given Lx =1and
pb =1 , p[B − A]x 5 pb = t(p,x)p[B − A]x for some t(p,x) = 1. Therefore
1 − t(p,x)Lx =1− t(p,x) 5 0 holds, so that every worker is not exploited in
terms of Deﬁnition 5.
Theorem 6 makes Deﬁnition 5 at least equivalent to Morishima’s ([10])
classical deﬁnition, from the viewpoint of preserving the FMT. Unlike the
latter approach, though, under Deﬁnition 5, the Marxian postulate that ex-
ploitation is synonymous with positive proﬁts holds even if other equilibrium
c o n c e p t sa r ea d o p t e d ,s u c ha sR o e m e r ’ s( [ 1 3 ] )R S .












0 > 0 if and only if every worker is exploited in the
sense of Deﬁnition 5.
Proof. Let α ≡
P
ν∈K αν, α0 ≡
P
ν∈K αν
0,a n dα0 ≡ α













0 S 0 ⇔ pb α
0 − 1 S 0.
First, suppose that pb α
0 − 1 > 0. Then, since pb =1 , it follows that
pb α
0 >p b= t(p,α0)pb α
0,f o rs o m et(p,α0) > 0. Because t(p,α0) < 1, it follows that
1 − t(p,α0)α0
0 =1− t(p,α0) > 0, so that every worker is exploited in terms of
Deﬁnition 5.
Next, if pb α
0 − 1=0 ,t h e ni nas i m i l a rw a y ,i tc a nb ep r o v e dt h a t1 −
t(p,α0)α0
0 =1− t(p,α0) =0 , so that no worker is exploited in the sense of
Deﬁnition 5.
Theorems 6 and 7 arguably provide further independent support to Deﬁ-
nition 5. If the epistemological role of the FMT is indeed as a postulate, as
assumed in most of the literature, they show that Deﬁnition 5 is preferable
to the main received deﬁnitions, and to Matsuo’s subjectivist approach, be-
cause it allows to derive a general, robust relation between exploitation and
proﬁts in general convex economies with heterogeneous agents.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper critically analyses the subjectivist approach to exploitation pro-
posed by Matsuo [7], in which preferences play a direct,d e ﬁnitional role,
23focusing on two central issues in exploitation theory, namely the deﬁnition of
measures of exploitation, and the relation between labour, exploitation, and
proﬁts, in general convex cone economies. The limits of Matsuo’s approach,
are shown with respect to both issues and it is argued that a minimal objec-
tivism is necessary in exploitation theory. To be sure, it is an open question
whether subjective preferences should play an indirect role in exploitation
theory, for instance in deﬁning individual exploitation status as the outcome
of individual leisure and consumption choices. This paper can be seen as the
ﬁrst step of a new axiomatic analysis of the role of preferences in exploitation
theory.
An alternative objectivist approach related to the ‘New Interpretation’ is
also brieﬂy analysed, and it is shown that it provides theoretically robust,
and empirically meaningful, indices of individual and aggregate exploitation
and it preserves the FMT in general convex economies. To be sure, these
ﬁndings are not suﬃcient to prove that the approach provides the foundations
for a general theory of exploitation in advanced capitalist economies. Two
shortcomings of the models analysed in this paper might be noted: the stark
class structure and the neglect of agents’ optimising choices. These issues are
important and they represent interesting lines for further research, but some
p o i n t sc a nb em a d et h a ts u g g e s tt h a tt h ed e ﬁnition proposed in this paper
may provide many interesting insights on exploitation in advanced capitalist
economies. First, [19] and [21] prove that, if Deﬁnition 5 is adopted, the FMT
can be extended to accumulation and subsistence economies with optimising
agents and, in less polarised economies with heterogeneous endowments, it
is possible to derive the full class and exploitation structure of the economy,
and a robust correspondence between class and exploitation status, in equi-
librium. Instead, these conclusions do not hold under the received deﬁnitions
of exploitation. Second, [21] provides a complete axiomatic characterisation
of Deﬁnition 5 in the context of general convex cone subsistence economies
with heterogeneous optimising agents: in such context, the objectivist ap-
proach analysed in this paper surprisingly emerges as the unique deﬁnition
of exploitation that satisﬁes a small set of rather weak axioms.10 Third, [16]
shows that, if Deﬁnition 5 is adopted, the core insights of the Marxian theory
of exploitation can be extended to economies with heterogeneous individual
endowments, general utility functions deﬁned over consumption and leisure,
and intertemporally optimising agents.
10See [19] for an axiomatic analysis of Deﬁnition 3 in accumulating economies.
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